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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #00152-84
12 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director

THROUGH : Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

SUBJECT : CIPC Study on Narcotics

1. You will soon receive the CIPC study for DCI signature. Before he signs it, you might want to consider whether some of its recommendations should be modified in execution or sent back to the CIPC for revision. The former is recommended. Although most of the recommendations in the study are reasonable and useful (paragraph 2), a few, all given in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 below, trespass on turf we have been trying to avoid.

2. Significant recommendations:

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3. Questionable recommendations for DCI actions

-- The DCI is asked to seek "from the President a national-level policy statement on the priority assigned to narcotics intelligence". Is this trip necessary? Would the DCI want to make such a trip? Is anyone in doubt about the priority of narcotics intelligence?

-- The study asks the DCI to "convey personally to the Intelligence Community principals his concern over the need to improve the coordination of narcotics intelligence collection in the field". The only agencies collecting narcotics intelligence abroad are CIA, NSA, and DEA. DEA is not part of the Intelligence Community, and therefore would not hear the DCI's appeal. CIA and NSA are cooperating already. Coordination problems have arisen between DEA and CIA but [redacted] we hope they have been solved.

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-- The study asks the DCI to "request the law enforcement organizations to refine their requirements for foreign intelligence support". Is this necessary? How would the DCI do it? Should the DCI be advising law enforcement organizations?

-- "The DCI should approve the National Intelligence Council recommendation for a full-time NIO for Narcotics." The NIC made the same recommendation last year. The NIO/EA and the NIO/NARCOTICS jobs probably should be separated, but it would be wiser to combine the NIO/NARCOTICS with terrorism or some other related subject. If we have a dedicated NIO for narcotics, then technology transfer, international organizations, and the like will not be far behind. Too many NIOs.

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4. Questionable recommendations for NIO/NARCOTICS action

- The NIO is asked to review production schedules for DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard, three non-Intelligence Community agencies. The review is to assure focus and coordination. This is a non-starter. Customs and Coast Guard do not have much production -- they mostly produce reports, not finished intelligence -- and DEA is unlikely to respond to outside review of their production.
- The NIO is asked to "direct a study examining the need for an interagency, all-source, multi-disciplinary National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) to manage the overall narcotics intelligence effort." There is little support for such a Center in either the Intelligence or law enforcement community, and the NIO does not have the authority to manage the overall narcotics intelligence effort. Making the NIO into a narcotics intelligence manager with operational powers introduces a new concept that few would welcome.

5. Questionable general recommendations

- The study asks that "Intelligence Community training elements should ...determine whether a longer-range interagency training program should be developed to provide an orientation for intelligence and US federal law enforcement professionals in the application of the fundamentals of the intelligence process to narcotics intelligence." Ad hoc training, as for NNBIS, is satisfactory; a formal training program would inevitably mingle the intelligence and law enforcement communities in ways which undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of Executive Order 12333. Ad hoc training can continue as needed.
- The study says that the Narcotics Working Group (which wrote the study) "will be constituted as a subcommittee of the CIPC to continue, on an ad hoc basis, its Community coordinating role and to monitor the progress of the recommendations." Is a permanent Narcotics Working Group needed? Most of the participating agencies are cool to the idea and few principals at the CIPC meeting showed much enthusiasm. There is an out, since the study goes on to say that "at the end of a 6-12 month period, the CIPC will review the feasibility of establishing the subcommittee as a permanent body of the CIPC." Six months should be enough for the Narcotics Working Group to finish up.


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